When a Relative, Tenant or Encroacher Occupies an NRI's Property in India: The Remedies and Their Limits

By Bhaskar Subramanian, Partner, S&S Co. Advocates & Solicitors and Adv. Rahul Jangra, Associate, S&S Co. Advocates & Solicitors

Published 30 October 2026 · Law stated as on 29 October 2026 · Informational content, not legal advice: see our disclaimer

A flat left with a brother, a house let to a tenant twelve years ago, a farmhouse boundary quietly pushed inward by a neighbour: each is a different legal problem masquerading as the same complaint, 'someone is sitting on my property'. This article separates the remedies by the kind of occupant involved, and sets out how an NRI owner actually brings the case while living abroad.

Four occupants, four different legal problems

Owners describe the problem the same way, 'my property is occupied', but the law treats a relative staying with permission, a tenant under a lease, a licensee with a revocable permission, and an encroacher with no permission at all as four distinct situations, each carrying its own remedy, its own forum and its own limitation clock. Getting the classification wrong at the outset is the most common reason an otherwise sound case drags on for years: a suit framed as a title suit against someone who is in fact a tenant protected by rent legislation can be dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and a rent-control eviction petition against someone who is in fact a co-owner or a licensee with no lease can fail for the opposite reason.

A relative in occupation with the owner's consent, a sibling, a parent, an adult child, is ordinarily a gratuitous licensee, someone permitted to use the property without rent and without a lease. Their occupation is lawful only for as long as the licence lasts; the owner can revoke a gratuitous licence at will under Section 60 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, subject to narrow exceptions discussed below. A tenant pays rent under an agreement, written or oral, that creates an interest in the property (a leasehold interest) recognised and regulated, in many States, by a dedicated rent control statute that displaces the ordinary civil remedy to a significant degree. A licensee who is not a relative, for instance a caretaker allowed to occupy a portion of the property in exchange for maintaining it, sits close to the gratuitous-licence category but can raise harder questions about whether what looks like a licence has, on the facts, ripened into something more. An encroacher has no permission from the owner at all; their occupation is a trespass from the outset, which keeps the full range of civil and criminal remedies open without any licence or tenancy to first terminate.

The practical first step in any such dispute, before deciding which forum to approach, is therefore to establish, from the documents and conduct actually available (rent receipts or their absence, correspondence, utility bills, revenue records, any written permission), which of these four categories genuinely fits the occupant. Oral tenancies are valid under Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act and are commonly proved through rent receipts or bank transfers even without a written lease; the absence of a document does not, by itself, turn a de facto tenant into a licensee or an encroacher.

Suit for possession and mesne profits

Where the occupant resists handing back the property and no summary statutory remedy applies, the owner's basic civil remedy is a suit for possession based on title, filed in the civil court having territorial jurisdiction over the property (ordinarily the court within whose local limits the property is situated, under Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908). The plaint must establish the plaintiff's title (through the original purchase deed, inheritance documents, or both), the fact and approximate date of the defendant's occupation, and, where relevant, the demand for possession already made and refused.

Mesne profits, defined in Section 2(12) of the CPC as the profits the person in wrongful possession actually received or could have received with ordinary diligence, together with interest, but excluding any profit due to the wrongful possessor's own improvements, are claimed alongside the possession relief and, under Order XX Rule 12 of the CPC, the court can pass a decree for possession and, separately, direct an inquiry into mesne profits from the date of suit (or an earlier date, if claimed and proved) up to the date possession is actually handed over or up to three years from the decree, whichever is earlier, with a fresh application needed to carry the inquiry further where recovery is delayed beyond that. Courts have held that Order XX Rule 12 is a mechanism among others, not a mandatory gateway, meaning a plaintiff is not barred from establishing mesne profits by other evidence if an inquiry is not separately ordered. In practice, proving mesne profits reliably, especially the rent the property could reasonably have fetched during the period of wrongful occupation, is easier where the owner can point to comparable rentals or an actual lease the defendant themselves entered with a sub-occupant, and weaker where the figures rest on bare assertion.

A possession suit against a family member carries a particular evidentiary complication: where the property was originally held jointly, or where the occupying relative was allowed in as part of a joint family arrangement that was never formally divided, courts examine whether the relative's possession was, in substance, possession on behalf of the whole family rather than an independent, hostile claim. This matters directly for limitation, discussed next, because time does not run against a co-owner from mere continued occupation by another co-owner unless and until that occupation becomes an open, hostile denial of the plaintiff's own right, communicated or made apparent to the other side.

Limitation: when the twelve years actually starts

A suit for possession of immovable property is governed by Article 64 or Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the choice between them is frequently contested in family disputes. Article 64 applies where the plaintiff's own case is that they were in possession and lost it, through dispossession or discontinuance of possession; the twelve years then run from the date of that dispossession or discontinuance. Article 65 applies where the suit is for possession of immovable property based on the plaintiff's title, as distinct from any prior possession of the plaintiff's own; there the twelve years run from the date the defendant's possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff, which is not necessarily the date the defendant first moved in. Which article governs a given suit depends on how the plaint is framed and on the facts actually pleaded, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly said this is tested by looking at the pleadings, not by the label the plaintiff's advocate puts on the claim.

For an NRI who allowed a relative into a family property years ago and is only now seeking possession, this distinction can decide the case before the merits are reached. If the relative's occupation began with the owner's permission (a licence, or an informal family arrangement) and has continued without any clear, communicated assertion by the relative that they now claim the property as their own, adverse to the owner, the twelve years under Article 65 may not have started running at all, however many years have passed, because mere permissive possession, however long, does not become adverse merely through the passage of time; it becomes adverse only when the occupant's conduct and assertions, known to the owner, convert a permissive holding into a hostile one. Where, on the other hand, the relative has for years openly dealt with the property as their own, paid the property tax in their own name, let out portions to third parties, or otherwise acted in ways inconsistent with merely holding under the owner's permission, a court may find that adverse possession began at an earlier, identifiable point, and that the twelve years have already run.

The Supreme Court's decision in Ravinder Kaur Grewal v Manjit Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729, decided 7 August 2019 by a three-judge bench, resolved a different but related question: whether a person who has themselves perfected title by adverse possession, having been in hostile, continuous and open possession for more than twelve years, can affirmatively sue to recover possession on the strength of that title, rather than being limited to raising adverse possession only as a defence (a 'shield') when sued by the original owner. The Court held that Article 65 contains no such bar, overruling earlier authority that had treated adverse possession as a shield only, and held that a plaintiff can rely on title acquired by adverse possession as a sword. This matters for an NRI owner in two directions at once: it confirms that an occupant who has genuinely perfected adverse possession against the owner could, in principle, bring their own suit to be recognised as owner, which raises the stakes of allowing any occupation, however informal, to continue indefinitely without any assertion of the owner's own rights; and it also means that an owner who delays too long in asserting title against an occupant whose possession has in fact turned hostile risks losing not just the practical ability to evict, but the underlying title itself, once the twelve years have run and are not interrupted.

The safest practical discipline, for an NRI owner who permits a relative to occupy a property, is to keep some periodic, provable assertion of ownership on record, continuing to pay or confirm payment of property tax in the owner's own name, visiting or instructing an agent to inspect periodically, and, where the relationship allows it, documenting the arrangement (even informally, by an exchange of letters or messages) as a licence rather than letting it go entirely undocumented for over a decade.

Evicting a tenant: rent control statute or ordinary civil suit

Where the occupant is a tenant, the first question is whether the premises fall within the State rent control statute applicable to that location, because most such statutes exempt certain classes of premises from their protective regime, commonly premises let out after a certain date, or premises above a specified monthly rent. The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, for instance, by Section 3(c), does not apply at all to premises, residential or commercial, whose monthly rent exceeds three thousand five hundred rupees, a threshold untouched by amendment since its introduction and consequently exceeded by the overwhelming majority of present-day tenancies in the city; whether a given tenancy has in fact crossed that threshold, including through disputed rent-enhancement notices, is itself sometimes litigated, as a 2026 Delhi High Court decision illustrates, where the court set aside an eviction decree because the Rent Controller had not first decided whether a contested rent enhancement had actually taken the tenancy above the cap. Where the rent control statute does not apply, eviction proceeds as an ordinary civil suit, founded on a notice to quit under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (which generally requires fifteen days' notice for a month-to-month tenancy of immovable property for non-agricultural or non-manufacturing purposes, served in writing, and expiring with the end of a tenancy month), followed by a suit for possession if the tenant does not vacate; such a suit can often proceed on a summary basis, since the Supreme Court has held that in an eviction suit founded on a valid notice determining the tenancy, the landlord is not required to prove title with the same rigour as in a title suit, and the tenant can resist eviction only on arguable and substantial grounds.

Where the rent control statute does apply, the landlord ordinarily approaches the Rent Controller (not the ordinary civil court) and must establish one of the statutory grounds for eviction, such as non-payment of rent, bona fide personal requirement, or subletting without consent, the available grounds varying by State statute. Several States give NRI landlords a materially faster route. The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, Section 13-B, allows a landlord who is a Non-Resident Indian to seek eviction for personal use by a summary procedure, under which the tenant must apply for leave to defend and can resist eviction only by disclosing facts that would disentitle the landlord to the benefit of the summary provision; the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of this summary mechanism in Ram Krishan Grover v Union of India, (2020) 12 SCC 506, and has since applied it to confirm, in Shanta Rani v Nasib Kaur (Civil Appeal No. 7328 of 2010, decided 5 October 2023), that an NRI landlord need not be physically present in India to invoke the provision, and that the burden lies on the tenant to show facts disentitling the landlord to summary eviction. The statutory conditions are nonetheless real limits, not formalities: the landlord must typically show NRI status, ownership of the premises for a continuous period (five years under the Punjab statute) before filing, a genuine requirement for personal use, and restrictions on reletting or resale for a period after possession is recovered; a landlord who does not genuinely intend to occupy the premises personally, or on behalf of a dependent, risks having the summary route denied even where the formal conditions appear to be met.

NRI owners should check, before filing, whether their own State's rent statute contains an equivalent summary or expedited provision (several States have similar, though not identical, NRI-landlord provisions) and should not assume the Punjab and Haryana position applies elsewhere; where no such provision exists, the ordinary rent-control eviction process, which can be considerably slower, is the only route for a tenancy within the Act's scope.

Revoking a family member's licence, and when it cannot be revoked

Where the occupant is a relative holding under a gratuitous licence rather than a tenancy, Section 60 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 generally permits the licensor (the owner) to revoke the licence at will. Two statutory and judicially developed exceptions matter in family disputes. First, under Section 60(a), a licence that is attached to a transfer of property and is necessary to effecting that transfer, and which the transfer is in force, cannot be revoked. Second, under Section 60(b), where the licensee has, acting on the licence, executed a work of a permanent character and incurred expenses in its execution, the licence becomes irrevocable; courts have read this exception narrowly, denying its protection where the construction or expenditure did not match what the licence actually authorised, and have cautioned against treating a licence as simultaneously irrevocable under Section 60(b) while allowing the licensor to revoke it merely on payment of compensation, since the two outcomes are inconsistent.

Where a licence is validly revoked, and the former licensee refuses to vacate, the licensor's remedy is a suit for possession; the Supreme Court has held that Section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act (or its equivalent in other States' Small Causes Courts legislation) can confer jurisdiction on Small Causes Courts over suits between licensor and licensee for recovery of possession specifically, which in the right forum can be markedly quicker than a full title suit in the ordinary civil court, since a licensor-licensee possession suit does not require the same elaborate proof of title that a stranger's trespass suit would.

The Senior Citizens Act: a narrow, summary remedy where the owner is elderly

Where the owner is the NRI's elderly parent, rather than the NRI personally, and the occupant is the NRI's sibling or another relative, the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 offers a materially faster, though narrower, route than an ordinary civil suit. Tribunals constituted under Section 7 of the Act can conduct a summary inquiry under Section 8 into a senior citizen's claim for maintenance, and the Supreme Court has now confirmed, reportedly in Ravi Kant Gupta v State of Uttar Pradesh and connected matters decided in August 2026 (following and reportedly consistent with Samtola Devi v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025, and Kamalakant Mishra v Additional Collector, 2025), that such a tribunal has the power, as an incident of the senior citizen's right to maintenance and protection rather than as an express, standalone power in the Act's text, to order eviction of an occupying relative from the senior citizen's property where that is necessary to protect the senior citizen's life, safety or welfare. The Court has also made clear that eviction under this route is not automatic or mandatory in every maintenance case; it is reserved for situations where protection of the senior citizen genuinely requires it, and a tribunal's jurisdiction here is not the same as a civil court's plenary jurisdiction to decide disputed questions of title or ownership.

A separate and more frequently litigated provision, Section 23 of the Act, lets a senior citizen who transferred property by gift or otherwise, subject to a condition that the transferee would provide the senior citizen with basic amenities and physical needs, have that transfer declared void if the transferee fails to provide for the senior citizen as promised. The Supreme Court, in Sudesh Chhikara v Ramti Devi, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1011, and consistently since, has held that Section 23 is attracted only where the transfer document itself, or the circumstances surrounding it, show that the transfer was made subject to an actual condition of maintenance; a transfer that carries no such condition, even if made by an elderly parent to a child, cannot later be undone merely because the relationship has broken down. The Madras High Court has added that the condition is generally expected to appear in the document itself, and some High Courts have also required the transfer to postdate the Act's 2008 commencement, though this last point, together with the degree to which a maintenance obligation can be inferred from family circumstances rather than express wording, remains an area where High Courts have not spoken with one voice.

For an NRI family, the Senior Citizens Act route is best understood as a complement to, not a substitute for, a civil title suit: it is faster and summary, suited to protecting a vulnerable parent quickly, but it does not finally determine ownership, and a relative who loses before the tribunal is not thereby barred from separately contesting title in a civil court, nor is the tribunal's order a full substitute for a properly pleaded and proved possession suit where the dispute is genuinely about who owns the property rather than about the senior citizen's immediate welfare.

Encroachment: boundary disputes and interim relief

Where the occupant is a stranger who has encroached without any permission, typically by pushing a boundary wall, fence or structure into the owner's land, the remedy is a civil suit for possession or for a mandatory injunction directing removal of the encroachment, supported where necessary by an interim, temporary injunction under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC to prevent the encroachment from being extended or consolidated while the suit is pending. Courts granting a temporary injunction weigh a prima facie case, the balance of convenience, and the risk of irreparable injury if the injunction is refused; a registered sale deed, a demarcation report from a court-appointed commissioner, or revenue records (survey settlement records, mutation entries) showing the boundary are the evidence usually relied upon to establish the prima facie case, and where the dispute is genuinely only about where a boundary lies rather than about who owns either side of it, courts have treated a surveyor's or commissioner's demarcation report as carrying significant evidentiary weight, though its probative value, and whether it can be challenged and on what grounds, is itself sometimes contested.

A mandatory injunction, which compels the encroacher to remove what has already been built rather than merely preventing further building, is treated by courts as available at the interim stage only in exceptional circumstances, requiring a strong prima facie case and a clear balance of convenience in the plaintiff's favour; an owner discovering an encroachment should therefore act promptly, since delay both weakens the case for interim relief and, if sufficiently prolonged, risks the occupant later asserting adverse possession under Article 65 once twelve years have run from when the encroachment became open and hostile.

Criminal trespass is also available against a genuine stranger-encroacher with no colour of right, under Section 329 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (which replaced Sections 441, 442, 447 and 448 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 with effect from 1 July 2024), which penalises entering or remaining on another's property with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy the occupant, with imprisonment of up to three months or a fine of up to five thousand rupees for simple criminal trespass, and up to one year's imprisonment for house-trespass, under the correspondingly renumbered sub-sections. A criminal complaint can sometimes produce faster practical results than a civil suit, particularly against a recent, unambiguous intrusion, but it is not a substitute for recovering possession through a civil decree, since a criminal court's focus is on punishing the trespass, not on adjudicating or restoring title or possession as between the parties; where the encroacher has any colour of claim, however weak, to the land (a disputed boundary, a claimed licence, a family relationship), criminal proceedings are far less likely to succeed and civil remedies become the realistic route.

Litigating from abroad: attorney, appearance and evidence

An NRI owner need not return to India for every step of a possession, eviction or injunction proceeding. Under Order III of the Code of Civil Procedure, a duly authorised power of attorney holder can appear, file applications and act on the owner's behalf as a recognised agent, including instructing the advocate who will actually argue the matter; the scope of that authority, how it must be executed and authenticated where the owner signs abroad, and the specific evidentiary limits on an attorney's testimony (an attorney can depose only to acts done personally under the power, not to facts within the owner's own knowledge, following Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v IndusInd Bank Ltd., (2005) 2 SCC 217) are addressed in detail in our companion article on powers of attorney for NRI property and litigation, and are not repeated at length here.

What is specific to a possession or eviction dispute is that the owner's own testimony is frequently indispensable, particularly on questions such as when and on what terms the occupant was first let in, since those are facts within the owner's own knowledge that an attorney cannot credibly depose to in the owner's place. Where personal appearance in India is not practicable, the appropriate route is an application for a commission to record the owner's evidence by video conference under Order XXVI of the CPC, a facility Indian courts have granted with increasing regularity following the Supreme Court's endorsement of video-conference evidence in State of Maharashtra v Dr Praful B Desai, subject to the applicant arranging reliable equipment and satisfying the court about the identity of the person testifying and the integrity of the connection. For a tenant-eviction matter proceeding on a largely documentary record (the lease, rent receipts, the notice to quit), the need for the owner's personal testimony is often less acute than in a family possession dispute that turns on oral understandings about how and why a relative came to occupy the property; owners should discuss with their advocate, before filing, how much of the eventual case is likely to depend on facts only they can speak to, since that assessment drives whether a video-conference commission should be sought early rather than only if a dispute over the owner's unavailability arises later.

Building the file: documents, pleadings and the practical sequence

Whatever the category of occupant, the file that actually wins a possession, eviction or injunction case is built from a predictable set of documents, and gathering them before filing, rather than scrambling for them after the other side files a defence, shortens the case considerably. For title, the owner needs the chain of documents showing how the property was acquired, the original purchase deed or allotment letter, mutation entries in the revenue or municipal records, property tax receipts in the owner's name, and, where the property passed by inheritance, the succession documents (a probated will, letters of administration, or a succession certificate, as the case requires) connecting the owner to the earlier titleholder. For the fact of occupation, dated evidence of when and how the occupant came to be there carries more weight than a bare assertion in the plaint: an exchange of letters, messages or emails recording the arrangement, rent receipts or bank transfers if any rent was ever paid, utility bills in either party's name, and, for a tenancy, the lease deed itself or correspondence referring to one. For a possession suit against a family member, photographs, family correspondence and witness statements from relatives who can speak to when the arrangement began and on what understanding often matter more than formal paper, precisely because such arrangements are rarely documented as carefully as a commercial lease.

The plaint or petition itself should plead, specifically and with dates where known, the acquisition of title, the date and circumstances in which the occupant's possession began, the character of that possession (permissive, tenancy, licence, or trespass from the outset), any demand for possession already made and its result, and the relief claimed, possession, mesne profits from a stated date, and, where applicable, an injunction. Where the claim could be read as resting on adverse possession, whether offensively (as the Ravinder Kaur Grewal line of authority now permits) or merely anticipating that defence from the other side, the plaint should plead the specific facts and dates relied upon, since a bare, generic assertion that twelve years have passed is not itself enough; courts require the plaintiff to show a subsisting title not barred by limitation, with the burden shifting to the defendant to establish adverse possession only once the plaintiff has made out at least a prima facie case of title and continuing right. Where the suit instead anticipates that the occupant will raise adverse possession as a defence, the plaint should pre-empt it by pleading, as specifically as possible, the absence of any point at which the occupant's holding became openly hostile and known to the owner, since this is precisely the factual ground on which such disputes are actually won or lost.

On sequencing, the practical order for an NRI owner is ordinarily: first, obtain or update the chain of title and revenue documents while still abroad, through a local agent or relative where a personal visit is not immediately possible; second, send a formal, dated demand for possession or vacation, by registered post or a lawyer's notice, both because some remedies (a civil suit on notice, a rent-control eviction) require prior notice as a precondition and because the demand itself becomes useful evidence of when the owner's assertion of right was first clearly communicated; third, decide, with the advocate handling the matter, which of the remedies above actually fits the occupant and the forum that follows from that choice, rather than defaulting to the civil court merely because it feels like the general-purpose option; fourth, execute and authenticate a power of attorney specific to the chosen proceeding, covering what the attorney will actually be asked to do, before the matter is filed, so that the first hearing is not delayed by a defective or overly narrow power; and fifth, assess early, rather than only if the question is later forced by the other side's objection, whether the owner's own evidence will be needed and, if so, whether a video-conference commission should be sought at the outset rather than as an afterthought.

What remains unsettled

Several questions in this area are genuinely open or decided differently by different courts, and should not be treated as settled nationally. Whether a maintenance obligation under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act can be inferred from the surrounding family relationship, or must appear as an express condition in the transfer document itself, continues to divide High Courts, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's general insistence on an actual condition. The precise boundary between a tribunal's eviction power under the Senior Citizens Act and a civil court's exclusive jurisdiction over genuinely disputed questions of title remains contested, with at least one High Court matter pending on whether a tribunal exceeded its summary jurisdiction by effectively deciding ownership. Whether and when a family member's long, permissive occupation converts into adverse possession, as opposed to remaining permissive indefinitely, is intensely fact-specific and has produced inconsistent outcomes depending on how clearly the occupant's hostile claim, if any, was communicated to the owner. And State rent control statutes vary enough, both in their exemption thresholds and in whether they offer any NRI-specific summary route, that no general statement about which forum applies can be treated as reliable without checking the specific State legislation governing the property in question.

The single most useful habit for an NRI owner, long before any dispute arises, is to classify precisely how any occupant came to be on the property, relative under permission, tenant under lease, licensee, or stranger with no claim at all, and to keep some periodic, provable record of the owner's own continuing assertion of title. That classification, more than any procedural tactic, determines which remedy is available, which forum hears it, and how the limitation clock runs.

Possession disputes involving family members carry a particular risk that purely commercial disputes do not: the reluctance to formalise what began as an informal family arrangement is exactly what later allows an occupant's claim to harden, whether through an eventual plea of adverse possession or simply through the practical difficulty of proving, years later, that occupation was always meant to be temporary. Addressing that risk early, even through something as simple as a dated letter recording the terms of occupation, generally costs far less than contesting it after the fact.

Frequently Asked Questions

References & Further Reading

The provisions, rulings and official documents below were relied on for this article, which states the law as on 29 October 2026. The position can change with amendments, rules and later decisions, so check the current text before acting on any of it.

1. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, s. 2(12) (mesne profits), s. 16, Order III, Order XX Rule 12, Order XXVI, Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2
2. Limitation Act, 1963, Articles 64 and 65, s. 27
3. Ravinder Kaur Grewal v Manjit Kaur, (2019) 8 SCC 729
4. Transfer of Property Act, 1882, ss. 105, 106
5. Indian Easements Act, 1882, s. 60
6. Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, s. 3(c)
7. East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, s. 13-B, s. 18-A
8. Ram Krishan Grover v Union of India, (2020) 12 SCC 506
9. Shanta Rani v Nasib Kaur, Civil Appeal No. 7328 of 2010, decided 5 October 2023
10. Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, ss. 7, 8, 23
11. Sudesh Chhikara v Ramti Devi, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1011
12. Ravi Kant Gupta v State of Uttar Pradesh and connected matters (Supreme Court, reported August 2026)
13. Samtola Devi v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 INSC 404
14. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, s. 329
15. Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v IndusInd Bank Ltd., (2005) 2 SCC 217
16. State of Maharashtra v Dr Praful B Desai, (2003) 4 SCC 601

Related reading on this site

• Tenant cannot claim ownership adverse possession guide
• Boundary encroachment disputes guide
• Boundary encroachment commissioner report evidentiary value high court
• Agricultural tenant rights state tenancy acts guide
• Nri power of attorney abroad property litigation article